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In  the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seuenth Circuit
No. 10-2363 
Ke it h  Po w e r s ,
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v.
USF Ho l l a n d , In c .,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division. 
No. 07 CV 246— Joseph S. Van Bokkelen, Judge.
Argued March 31, 2011—Decided December 15, 2011
Before Cu d a h y , Po s n e r , and Ma n io n , Circuit Judges.
Ma n io n , Circuit Judge. Keith Powers injured his 
back while working for USF Holland, Inc., but following 
a worker's compensation leave, he successfully 
returned to work as a long-haul truck driver and 
worked without incident for two years. As the birth 
of his child neared, Powers asked to switch from 
his long-haul driver assignment to a city driver route. 
After the switch, Powers began having problems with 
his back and asked to switch back, but the collective
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bargaining agreement did not allow for another change 
within a year, so Holland denied Powers's request. 
Powers then took a medical leave of absence, but 
later sought to return to work, again as a long-haul 
driver, presenting Holland with a medical release 
which limited him to "road driver work" and "limited 
dock work." Holland would not allow Powers to 
return, saying both that it needed clarification on 
his medical restrictions and that he could not return to 
work as a truck driver unless he received a medical 
release without restrictions.
Powers then sued Holland, alleging Holland violated 
the Americans with Disabilities Act by enforcing a 
100% healed policy, by discriminating against him, 
and by failing to provide him with a reasonable accom­
modation. Specifically, Powers claimed that he is dis­
abled because his back injury rendered him sub­
stantially limited in the major life activity of working. 
In addition, he claimed that Holland discriminated 
against him and refused to accommodate his 
disability by refusing to allow him to return to work 
as a long-haul road driver with certain medical restric­
tions. The district court granted Holland summary 
judgment and Powers appeals.
We conclude that Powers is not substantially limited 
in the major life activity of working because he is 
capable of long-haul driving. At most, the record 
merely shows that Powers is unable to work as a 
city driver because it involves short hauls and dock
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work that requires him to frequently load and unload 
cargo using a forklift or other lift mechanisms. 
Therefore, Powers is not disabled within the meaning 
of the ADA, and accordingly his claims cannot succeed. 
We affirm.
I.
Powers began working in the spring of 1999 as a 
truck driver for Holland. Holland is a freight transporta­
tion company which operates terminals throughout 
the United States, including the one in South Bend, 
Indiana, where Powers worked. Drivers working out 
of Holland's South Bend terminal are classified as 
either city drivers or road drivers. City drivers 
make short hauls and remain within a one-hundred- 
mile radius of the South Bend terminal and also perform 
dock work, primarily the loading of freight into and 
out of the trucks with a forklift. Road drivers make 
long hauls and may also load and unload freight. 
However, since they drive longer distances across 
state lines, they spend most of their time driving 
and have substantially less dock work.
In January 2002, Powers injured his back after driving 
a company truck over a rough patch of road. He was 
off work and received worker's compensation benefits 
for about five months before Holland required him 
to submit to an independent medical examination. Dr. 
Marshall Matz examined Powers and concluded that 
he was "capable of resuming his usual gainful employ-
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ment activity without limitations or restriction." Based 
on Dr. Matz's assessment of Powers, Holland ceased 
Powers's worker's compensation benefits effective 
May 23, 2002.
Powers returned to work as a road driver in June 
2002 and worked for two years without issue. But 
in March 2004, Powers requested a switch to a city 
driver position because his wife was pregnant and 
due to give birth in August, and because his ailing 
father needed help with his farming business. Holland 
granted Powers's request to work as a city driver. After 
the switch, Powers experienced difficulty sitting in 
and getting in and out of the forklift to do the sub­
stantial dock work required of city drivers. As a result, 
he had problems getting out of bed and bending over. 
Only one month after making the switch, Powers asked 
to be placed back in the road driver position. But 
under the governing collective bargaining agreement, 
drivers were only allowed one transfer per twelve­
month period and accordingly Holland denied Powers's 
request.
In August 2004, Powers's supervisor reprimanded him 
for working slowly and after Powers explained that 
he was working as fast as he could with his back bother­
ing him, Powers was told he would be subject to disci­
plinary action if he continued to work while experienc­
ing pain. Powers left work that day and on August 
29, 2004, Powers's physician, Dr. Magill, recommended 
that Powers discontinue work until further no-
Case: 10-2363 Document: 29 Filed: 12/15/2011 Pages: 24
No. 10-2363 5
tice. Holland then placed Powers on unpaid medical 
leave. A year and a half later, on December 12, 2005, 
Powers showed up at the Holland South Bend 
terminal and requested to return to work. He brought 
with him a release obtained from Dr. Magill, 
which provided that Powers could return to work 
on January 3, 2006, with the following restrictions: 
"(1) limit hours of dock work; (2) avoid dock plates 
as much as possible; (3) tractor needs to be supplied with 
air seat, suspension, cab, and (4) road driver work only." 
Powers acknowledged that he helped Dr. Magill 
write these restrictions.
The supervisor on duty when Powers arrived at 
the South Bend terminal sent him to the Wipperman 
Occupational Health center for a return to work 
and fitness for duty examination, where on December 
13, 2005, Dr. Bergin evaluated Powers. Dr. Bergin 
told Powers that she needed to review his 
medical records, but before she received the records, 
H olland's Human Resources M anager, Stacey 
VandeVusse, learned of Powers's request to return 
to work and reviewed the restrictions noted by 
Dr. Magill. VandeVusse told Dr. Bergin that the return- 
to-work physical was premature. According to 
Dr. Bergin, she also indicated that Powers could 
not return to work until he was released without restric­
tions. On December 21, 2005, Kurt Kopczynski, the South 
Bend Terminal Manager, also relayed to Powers Hol­
land's position that he would not be able to return 
to work with restrictions.
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VandeVusse later contacted Powers and told him 
that Holland needed additional information on the 
restrictions. Specifically, VandeVusse noted that 
all drivers performed dock work and that Holland 
needed clarification concerning what "limited hours of 
dock work" meant, especially in light of its 
apparent conflict with the statement "road driver 
work only." VandeVusse then asked Powers to complete 
a "Request for Accommodation" form and to return it 
to her by February 2006. She also provided a job analysis 
worksheet for the city driver position.
On January 30, 2006, Powers wrote to VandeVusse, 
informing her that his physician's office "does not 
do that type of examination," and that if Holland re­
quired him to have a physician complete the "Request 
for Accommodation" form, it would have to 
schedule and pay for the medical examination and 
pay Powers his current hourly wage rate for the 
time spent attending the medical examination. 
Powers also requested additional time to submit 
the required paperwork. In response, VandeVusse 
told Powers that he could have another month to com­
plete the paperwork and explained that he did not need 
another examination—he simply needed to have his 
physician provide clarification regarding the limitations 
by completing the form. Powers never returned the 
completed Request for Accommodation form to Holland, 
but contends that Holland was not truly seeking clarifi­
cation given its statements that he needed a full release 
to return to work. Powers attempted to return to work
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again as a road driver in May 2007, but Kopczynski 
refused his request and reiterated that Powers would not 
be allowed to return to work until he had no medical 
restrictions. Powers currently remains on unpaid medi­
cal leave of absence from Holland.
Powers eventually sued Holland alleging Holland had 
violated the ADA by enforcing a 100% healed policy, by 
discriminating against him, and by failing to provide 
him with a reasonable accommodation. Powers 
also alleged state law claims of negligent infliction of 
emotional distress and retaliatory discharge.
Holland moved for summary judgment on all of 
Powers's claims. The district court initially granted 
Holland's motion in part and denied it in part. Specifi­
cally, the district court concluded that Powers was 
not "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA and 
therefore that Holland was entitled to summary judg­
ment on Powers's disparate treatment and reasonable 
accommodation claims. However, the court deter­
mined that Powers had presented sufficient 
evidence that Holland had applied a 100% healed policy 
to him and thus that Holland was not entitled to sum­
mary judgment on Powers's per se discrimination 
claim. The district court also granted Holland summary 
judgment on Powers's state law claims. Holland moved 
for reconsideration on the 100% healed policy claim, 
noting that because Powers was not disabled within 
the meaning of the ADA, he could not present a per 
se discrimination claim. The district court agreed and
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then granted Holland summary judgment on this sole 
remaining claim. Powers appeals.
II.
On appeal, Powers argues that the district court 
erred in granting Holland summary judgment on 
his ADA claims.1 Summary judgment is appropriate 
if there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). We review the district court's 
decision on summary judgment de novo, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to Pow­
ers. Wackett v. City o f Beaver Dam, Wis., 642 F.3d 578, 581 
(7th Cir. 2011).
Before the district court, Powers presented three types 
of ADA claims: disparate treatment, failure to accommo­
date, and per se discrimination based on Holland's 
100% healed policy.2 To maintain any of these three 
claims, though, Powers must be disabled within 
the meaning of the ADA. Miller v. Ill. Dept. o f Trans.,
1 Powers does not challenge the district court's ruling on his 
state law claims.
2 On appeal, Powers attempts to also argue a retaliation claim, 
but his EEOC charge did not include a retaliation claim, nor did 
he argue such a claim before the district court, and therefore he 
has waived any such claim. Hottenroth v. Village of Slinger, 
388 F.3d 1015, 1033 (7th Cir. 2004).
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643 F.3d 190, 195 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Henderson 
v. Ardco, Inc., 247 F.3d 645, 653 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(stating that all courts "agree that a 100% rule is imper­
missible as to a disabled person—but one must first be 
disabled"). Merely having a physical injury or a 
medical condition is not enough. Burnett v. LFW, Inc., 
472 F.3d 471, 483 (7th Cir. 2006); Christian v. St. 
Anthony Medical Center, Inc., 117 F.3d 1051, 1053 (7th 
Cir. 1997). Rather, to be disabled within the meaning 
of the ADA, the plaintiff must have "(A) [a] physical 
or mental impairment that substantially limits one 
or more of the major life activities of [the] individual; 
(B) [a] record of such an impairment; or (C) [be] re­
garded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(2) (2006).
On appeal, Powers argues that he is disabled under 
both the first and third prongs—in other words, that he 
has both an actual physical limitation in the major 
life activity of working and that Holland has regarded 
him as having such an impairment. In addition to 
the major life activity of working, Powers also 
makes passing reference on appeal to the major 
life activities of "lifting, sitting, and/or bending." Appel­
lant Brief at 28. But in opposing Holland's summary 
judgment motion before the district court, Powers 
merely argued that he was substantially limited in 
the major life activity of working. Therefore, any argu­
ment regarding these other activities is waived. 
Fredricksen v. United Parcel Serv., Co., 581 F.3d 516, 
521 (7th Cir. 2009). Moreover, even assuming Powers
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had not waived the argument, the record is in­
sufficient to show that Powers's back injury substantially 
limited his ability to lift, sit, or bend. The interpretive 
regulation s define "sub stantially  lim its" as 
"[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner 
or duration under which an individual can perform 
a particular major life activity as compared to 
the condition, manner, or duration under which 
an average person in the general population can 
perform the same major life activity." 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). In this case, the record shows 
that Powers engaged in many activities requiring lifting, 
sitting and bending. Specifically, Powers testified that 
he didn't have any trouble lying flat or walking, that 
he could perform most household chores and 
bathe himself, and that he could sit comfortably in 
a chair for at least two hours. Powers also testified 
that he was presently employed as a warehouse 
foreman for his father's agricultural company where 
he had been performing work that was more physically 
demanding than the work he would be doing at Hol­
land, and which included cleaning out bins, running 
equipment, and driving trucks. The evidence thus 
does not show that Powers was substantially more 
limited than the average person in lifting, sitting 
or bending. See, e.g., Moore v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 
221 F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the plain­
tiff did not present sufficient evidence that 
arthritis substantially limited his ability to walk 
when compared with the general population based
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on the plaintiff's testimony concerning his activities). 
Accordingly, our focus is solely on whether Powers is 
(or was viewed by Holland) as substantially limited 
in the major life activity of working.
A. "Actually Disabled"
To be substantially limited in the major life activity 
of working means that a claimant is "significantly re­
stricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a 
broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the 
average person having comparable training, skills and 
abilities3." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(I). A class of jobs 
includes "the number and types of jobs utilizing similar 
training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within 
[the employee's] geographical area, . . . ." 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B). A broad range of jobs includes 
"the number and types of other jobs not utilizing 
similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities within 
that geographical area." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(C).
Powers contends that the specific limitations noted by 
Dr. Magill establish his inability to work as a truck driver 
and that this is a class of jobs, and that as such he is
3 While this circuit and the EEOC have concluded that 
"working" is a major life activity, the Supreme Court has 
reserved judgment on that question. See E.E.O.C. v. Schneider 
Nat., Inc., 481 F.3d 507, 511 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Sutton v. 
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999)).
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substantially limited in the major life activity of working.4 
In support of his position, Powers relies on Best v. Shell 
Oil Co., 107 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 1997). In Best, this court 
held that "truck driver" was a class of jobs and that the 
plaintiff presented sufficient evidence such that a "reason­
able trier of fact could conclude that [the plaintiff's] 
bad knee substantially limited his ability to work as a truck 
driver." Id. at 548.
Best, though, is readily distinguishable from the case 
before us. In Best, the plaintiff's condition made it pain­
ful to bend his "knee more than 90 degrees inward toward  
his body," rendering him unable to drive m ost of the trucks 
in the defendant's fleet. Id. at 545. One of the defendant's 
own doctors concluded that the plaintiff "w ould have 
difficulty maintaining this position at this tim e" and 
should "consider alternative work duties on a fulltime basis 
for the future." Id. at 548. And a Driver Performance Evalua­
tion of Best concluded that the plaintiff "w as not safe 
and should not be driving.” Id. Based on this evidence, 
the Best court concluded that "a reasonable trier of 
fact could find that Best's bad knee substantially 
limited his ability to work as a truck driver." Id.
Conversely, the evidence in this case is insufficient to 
show that Powers is unable to drive trucks. Powers's
4 Powers does not argue that he is limited in a broad range of 
jobs, nor would such an argument succeed given that Powers is 
working in another job which, as Powers himself testified, is 
more physically challenging than the work he would be doing 
at Holland.
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restrictions—i.e., "limit hours of dock work" and "avoid 
dock plates as much as possible"—relate to dock work and 
not truck driving, and we have already held that "forklift 
operation" was not alone "broad enough to constitute 
a class of jobs." Contreras v. Suncast Corp., 237 F.3d 756, 
763 (7th Cir. 2001). Powers's third restriction, that 
the "tractor needs to be supplied with air seat, suspension, 
cab," is also insufficient to show that Powers would 
be barred from driving trucks because, as Powers testified 
in his deposition, the trucks Holland supplies already 
meet those requirements. This fact again contrasts 
sharply with Best, where the evidence was the opposite: 
the plaintiff in that case could not operate most of 
the trucks in the defendant's fleet, indicating that he would 
face the same difficulty with other employers. Finally, 
the fourth "restriction," rather than establishing a limita­
tion on truck driving, established that Powers is able 
to operate trucks, stating "road driver work only."
Powers also did not present any evidence that his 
infirmities prevent him from other truck driving jobs 
or that most other truck driving jobs required dock work. 
In fact, the evidence is to the contrary: When asked in 
his deposition: "If you were able to find a job that was 
a line haul position only, kinda like the one you had 
back at Roadway, where you really didn't have to do any 
dock work, do you believe that you would be able 
to physically perform that job?" Powers answered 
"yes." Thus, the evidence cannot support the 
conclusion that Powers is unable to work in the class of 
jobs as a truck driver; at best, the evidence shows only 
that Powers would not be able to perform truck driving
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jobs that require a significant amount of dock work.5 
However, "[i]t is now well-established that an inability 
to perform a particular job for a particular employer is 
not sufficient to establish a substantial limitation on 
the ability to work; rather, the impairment must substan­
tially limit employment generally." Homeyer v. 
Stanley Tulchin Assoc., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir. 1996).
This case thus compares more closely with Baulos 
v. Roadway Express, Inc., 139 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1998). 
In Baulos, Baulos and Schneider sued Roadway Express 
claiming they were disabled because they were substan­
tially limited in the major life activity of working and 
that Roadway failed to accommodate their disabilities 
in violation of the ADA. This court held that the 
plaintiffs were not disabled within the meaning of 
the ADA because their impairments only prevented 
them from performing a specific job for Roadway, labeled 
"sleeper duty" truck driving. A "sleeper duty" truck driver 
worked with a partner and while one person drove, the
5 In arguing that he is limited in the major life activity of 
working, Powers also relies on the deposition testimony 
provided by Dr. Ghanayem in Powers's worker's compensation 
case against Holland. Powers's reliance on Dr. Ghanayem's 
testimony, however, is misplaced. Dr. Ghanayem examined 
Powers in October 2004—more than a year before Powers 
received a medical release from Dr. Magill. Dr. Magill's more 
current release concludes that Powers can drive a truck, with the 
four restrictions noted above, and Powers cannot establish 
otherwise by relying on the older medical opinion provided by 
Dr. Ghanayem.
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other would sleep for five to eight hours in an 
adjacent sleeper cab of the truck. Id. at 1149. Both plaintiffs 
suffered medical problems when working on sleeper 
duty (limited sleep disorder and related problems), 
which made them unsafe to drive. Both unsuccessfully 
sought reassignment to single-man trucks.6 Id. at 1150. 
This court held that Baulos and Schneider were not dis­
abled within the meaning of the ADA because 
their inability to drive sleeper trucks did not "disqualify 
them from a similar class of truck driving jobs that do 
not include sleeper duty." Id. at 1153. In reaching 
this conclusion, the Baulos court distinguished Best, 
noting that in Best, the plaintiff presented sufficient 
evidence from which a jury could find that the 
plaintiff would "face the same clutch and seat problems 
in many truck driving positions (class of jobs)." Id. at 
1152. But "[ujnlike in Best, Roadway and the doctors 
that it relied on have not indicated that plaintiffs would 
experience the same disqualification in other truck driving 
positions." Id. Thus, in Baulos we concluded that the 
employer was entitled to summary judgment because 
the plaintiffs did not establish that they were substantially 
limited in the major life activity of working.
Accordingly, while Best makes clear that truck driving 
is a class of jobs, Baulos clarifies that to prevail on a 
claim that he is substantially impaired in the major 
life activity of working, a plaintiff must present evidence
6 Because of the union's seniority scheme, Roadway could not 
exempt the plaintiffs from all sleeper duty. Id. at 1149-50.
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that, if believed, would support the conclusion that he is 
unable to work as a truck driver in general. Merely 
being unable to work as a specific type of truck driver, 
or for a specific employer, is not enough. Our sister 
circuits agree and have likewise held that a plaintiff is 
not disabled merely because he cannot perform a 
specific truck-driving job. See McLain v. Andersen Corp., 
567 F.3d 956, 968 (8th Cir. 2009); Collado v. United 
Parcel Serv, C o, 419 F.3d 1143, 1157 (11th Cir. 2005); 
Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 339 F.3d 682, 686 (8th 
Cir. 2003); EEOC v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 321 F.3d 69, 76­
77 (2d Cir. 2003); Black v. Roadway Express, Inc., 297 
F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2002); Duncan v. Washington Metro­
politan Area Transit Authority, 240 F.3d 1110, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 
2001); Marinelli v. City of Erie, PA, 216 F.3d 354, 366 (3d Cir. 
2000).
Here, at best Powers has shown only that he cannot 
work as a truck driver in positions requiring signi­
ficant dock work. In fact, the evidence was that Powers 
worked as a long-haul driver for two years without 
any problems and that his problems arose only after 
he transferred to city driver work. In short, there is 
no ev id en ce in the record that  Powers ' s  
impairment prevents him from working as a truck 
driver in general. And it is Powers's burden to present 
such evidence. DePaoli v. Abbott Lab., 140 F.3d 668, 672 
(7th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, based on this record, 
we cannot conclude that Powers is actually impaired in 
the major life activity of working.
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B. "Regarded As" Disabled
Alternatively, Powers maintains that even if he does 
not have an actual substantial impairment in the major life 
activity of working, Holland regarded him as having such 
an impairment. Under the "regarded as" prong, 
the employer must believe, rightly or wrongly, that 
the employee has an impairment that substantially limits 
one or more major life activities. Kupstas v. City o f Green­
wood, 398 F.3d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 2005). Under the 
"regarded as" theory of disability, then, Powers must 
show that Holland believed he was substantially limited 
in his ability to perform the major life activity of working.7
7 Congress changed these standards when it enacted the ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008 ("AD AAA"). Under the ADAAA, a 
person may be "regarded as" disabled "because of an actual or 
perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the 
impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity." 
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3). The amendments, however, did not take 
effect until January 1, 2009, so we apply the law in effect at the 
time of the alleged violations. Fredricksen, 581 F.3d at 521 
n.1. Moreover, even if the ADAAA did govern, Powers's 
claim would still be doomed because the ADAAA clarified that 
an individual "regarded as" disabled (as opposed to actually 
disabled) is not entitled to a "reasonable accommodation." 
42 U.S.C. 12201(h). (This court had left that question open 
under the ADA. See Cigan v. Chippewa Falls School Dist., 388 
F.3d 331, 335 (7th Cir. 2004).) And Powers's ADA claims 
all presume that Holland would be required to accommodate 
him in some way, i.e., by transferring him to a different job 
or limiting the amount of dock work he must perform.
(continued...)
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Id. And to be regarded as substantially limited in the 
ability to work, Powers needed to present some evidence 
that Holland "regarded him as limited in his ability to 
perform not merely one particular job but a class or broad 
range of jobs." Miller, 643 F.3d at 195. But there is no 
such evidence in the record; rather, the evidence merely 
shows that Holland would not allow Powers to return 
to work as a city driver, either based on his ambiguous 
work restrictions or because Holland required Powers to 
be released without restrictions, i.e., its 100% healed 
policy.7 8
Powers responds that Holland's 100% healed policy 
itself establishes that it regarded Powers as disabled.9 In
7 (...continued)
Therefore Powers would fare no better under the ADAAA.
8 Holland claims that it did not have a 100% healed policy, but 
as noted above, there was evidence that VandeVusse told Dr. 
Bergin that Powers would not be returned to work until he was 
released without restrictions. And Kurt Kopczynski, the South 
Bend Terminal Manager, also relayed this information to 
Powers, telling him he would not be able to return to work with 
restrictions. Additionally, Neil London, Holland's Labor 
Relations Manager, testified in his deposition that Holland's 
policy was that you "cannot return to work from an on-the-job 
injury without full release to return to work." Thus, as the 
district court concluded, Powers presented sufficient evidence 
that Holland applied a 100% healed policy.
9 In arguing that Holland regarded him as disabled, Powers 
also relies on the deposition testimony provided by Dr.
(continued...)
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support of his position, Powers cites decisions from 
other circuits which have held that a "100% healed" 
policy could be sufficient to establish that an employer 
"regarded" the plaintiff as substantially limited in 
the major life activity of working. See, e.g., Jones v. 
UPS, Inc., 502 F.3d 1176, 1188-89 (10th Cir. 2007); Johnson 
v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1226 
(9th Cir. 2001); Henderson, 247 F.3d at 653. This circuit 
has yet to specifically address that question, but these 
holdings seem inconsistent with the Supreme Court's 
conclusion that "an employer is free to decide that physical 
characteristics or medical conditions that do not rise to 
the level of an impairment—such as one's height, build, 
or singing voice—are preferable to others, just as it is free 
to decide that some limiting, but not substantially limiting, 
impairments make individuals less than ideally suited for 
a job." Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 490­
91 (1999). In other words, a particular impairment may 
disqualify a person for a specific job that the employer 
needs to fill. Without some evidence that the employer 9
9 (...continued)
Ghanayem in Powers's worker's compensation case against 
Holland. But as noted above, Dr. Ghanayem examined Powers 
more than a year before Powers showed up at Holland's 
terminal with a medical release from Dr. Magill. Additionally, 
there is no evidence that the decision-makers in this case knew 
anything about Dr. Ghanayem's deposition testimony. There­
fore, Dr. Ghanayem's opinion cannot create a reasonable 
inference that Holland regarded Powers as substantially limited 
in the major life activity of working.
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actually viewed the impaired (but not disabled) individual 
as unable to work for other employers in a class of jobs 
or a broad range of jobs, a 100% healed policy merely 
shows that this employer's preference is to hire someone 
without any impairments. Under the ADA that would 
not be a violation unless the individual is actually disabled. 
Id. See also Christian, 117 F.3d at 1053 ("The Act is not a 
general protection of medically afflicted persons. . . . [I]f 
the employer discriminates against them on account 
of their being (or being believed by him to be) ill, 
even permanently ill, but not disabled, there is no viola­
tion.").
From a business perspective, a 100% healed policy 
would likely be a disadvantage economically because 
an employer would be losing someone who might be 
the best person for the job. Also, if the impairment 
were such that the employee is actually disabled, then 
the employer might be subject to per se liability under 
the ADA. See Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 
F.3d 685, 698 (7th Cir. 1998); McGregor v. Nat'l R.R. Passen­
ger Corp., 187 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1999); Henderson, 247 
F.3d at 653. (The risk of such a policy is even greater (if not 
absolute) now that the ADAAA has changed the definition 
of "regarded as" disabled.) On the other hand, an employer 
in the trucking industry might decide that it does not want 
to risk one of its drivers causing an injury and creating tort 
liability. This later reasoning is consistent with Holland's 
Labor Relations Manager's testimony that it has adopted 
this 100% healed policy because "they are in a safety 
sensitive industry." We said in E.E.O.C. v. Schneider Nat., 
Inc., 481 F.3d 507 (7th Cir. 2007), that there is nothing
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illegal about being more risk-averse than others in the 
industry and that the defendant "is entitled to determine 
how much risk is too great for it to be willing to take." 
Id. at 510. In that case, the employer would not allow a 
truck driver with neurocardiogenic syncope to return 
to work and the employee claimed an actual or perceived 
disability in the major life activity of working. Id. 
We reasoned that the impairment did not substantially 
limit the plaintiff in the major life activity of working 
and that the evidence was insufficient to show that Schnei­
der regarded the plaintiff as limited in the major 
life activity of working. We reasoned that "there [was] 
no evidence that Schneider considers neurocardiogenic 
syncope to impair any 'life activity' other than driving 
a truck for Schneider, and perhaps for some other 
truck companies (we do not know whether there are any) 
that like Schneider have safety standards higher than the 
minimum required by the federal government." Id. at 511. 
We concluded "that is too esoteric a capability to be judged 
a 'major' life activity." Id. Similarly, in this case, there is 
no evidence that Holland considered Powers's impair­
ments as affecting any life activity other than working as a 
city driver for Holland. Under Schneider, that is not enough.
Regarding Holland's 100% healed policy, in addition to 
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sutton and this court's 
precedent in Schneider and Baulos, we find the Tenth 
Circuit's reasoning in Dillon v. Mountain Coal Co., LLC, 569 
F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2009), more consistent with the facts of 
this case. In Dillon, the employer had a 100% healed (no 
restrictions) policy and its application prevented the 
plaintiff from returning to work in the defendant's coal
Case: 10-2363 Document: 29 Filed: 12/15/2011 Pages: 24
22 No. 10-2363
mine. Id. at 1219. The plaintiff argued that the employer 
thus regarded him as disabled in the major life activity of 
working, either in a "class of jobs" (mining jobs) or in a 
"broad range of jobs." Id. at 1220. The Tenth Circuit 
rejected this argument because the plaintiff had not 
presented any evidence concerning "the number and types 
of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skill or 
abilities" in the geographic area, as the EEOC regulations 
require. Id. Without such evidence, the court reasoned that 
"[t]he policy, however, only speaks to whether Mountain 
Coal regarded [the plaintiff] as substantially limited in his 
ability to work at West Elk Mine." Id. The court then 
concluded that "while a jury could infer that Mountain 
Coal considered [the plaintiff] as substantially limited in 
his ability to work at West Elk Mine, there was no evidence 
that Mountain Coal regarded him as substantially limited 
in his ability to work outside of West Elk Mine, or that the 
jobs within the mine could properly be characterized as a 
'class of jobs' or a 'broad range of jobs.'" Id.
Similarly, in this case, Powers has not presented any 
evidence that Holland viewed him as limited in his ability 
to work for an employer other than Holland, nor has 
Powers shown that the jobs at Holland constituted a "class 
of jobs" or a "broad range of jobs." While truck driving in 
general is a broad class of jobs, the two truck driving jobs 
at Holland, especially city driving, require dock work. This 
condition significantly narrows the type of truck driving 
needed, compared to the general classification of truck 
driving. Cf. Baulos, 139 F.3d at 1152-53. Or at least based on 
this record, we cannot conclude that Holland's two truck­
driving positions constitute a class of jobs: Like Dillon, the
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record is devoid of any evidence addressing the number of 
truck driving jobs available (or unavailable) to Powers. At 
best then, Holland's 100% healed policy, like the policy in 
Dillon, only shows that Holland regarded Powers as 
substantially limited in his ability to work as a truck driver 
for Holland. That is not enough for Powers to qualify as 
disabled under the "regarded as" prong of the ADA.
In sum, it was Powers's burden to come forward with 
evidence that could satisfy his ultimate burden of showing 
an ADA-recognized disability. DePaoli, 140 F.3d at 672. 
Powers has not done so, though, and without evidence that 
he is disabled, as defined by the ADA, Powers cannot 
succeed on a disparate treatment, per se discrimination, or 
reasonable accommodation claim. Accordingly, Holland is 
entitled to summary judgment on all of Powers's ADA 
claims.10
10 Powers is still on leave from Holland and, as Holland's 
attorney confirmed at oral argument, Powers could still submit 
a doctor's report and seek to return to work—Holland just needs 
clarification on his limitations. Powers intimates that he never 
attempted to have a doctor clarify his restrictions because it 
would be futile, since Holland told him that he needed to be 
released without restrictions, i.e., 100% healed. During this 
litigation, though, Holland maintained that it does not apply a 
100% healed policy, and under the ADAAA, which would now 
apply, it would be risky for Holland to apply such a policy. 
And a reverse course by Holland now might also be evidence 
of retaliation or pretext. Thus, should Powers truly wish 
to return to work, he need only obtain the clarification Holland 
requested.
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III.
Powers did not present sufficient evidence of an impair­
ment that substantially limited his ability to perform the 
major life activity of working, nor did he present evidence 
from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Holland 
perceived him as having such an impairment. Rather, at 
best, the evidence shows that Powers's infirmities pre­
vented him from performing one specific job for Hol­
land—city driver. That is insufficient to qualify as disabled 
under the ADA. Because Powers is not disabled within the 
meaning of the ADA, his discrimination, per se discrimina­
tion, and reasonable accommodation claims fail and 
Holland is entitled to summary judgment. We AFFIRM.
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